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IDEAS & ISSUES (PME/WARFIG~TING) 
People First 
Inspiring an intellectual renaissance to reinvigorate 
strategic thinking in the Marine Corps 
by Mie Augier & Maj Sean F.X. Barrett 
u[P}eople are more im-
P.Ortant than systems."1 
-LtGen Bernard E. 
Trainor, 
Marine Corps Gazette, 
September 19832 
F
ollowing seventeen years of war 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
Marine: Corps is in the: process 
of turning its focus to the "re-
emergence oflong-term, strategic com-
petition" with "revisionist powers," as 
directed by former Secretary James N. 
Mattis' National Defense Stracegy.2 The 
Marine Corps will be forced to confront 
this new security paradigm with a force 
that has increasingly little combat expe-
rience, especially among its company 
grade officer and NCO ranks. Given the 
enormity of these challenges, including 
the "increasingly complex global security 
environmem,"3 the Marine Corps will 
benefit from looking at its own history in 
order to inform how it will confronc this 
future operating environment. While 
today's siren song of technology, weap-
ons systems, and artificial intelligence 
promises quick and clean solutions, 4 
this article notes that seemingly radical 
change is oftentimes messy, surprisingly 
gradual, and attempts to nudge the pen-
dulum back toward the idea that people 
matter most. This emphasis is consistent 
with important aspects and people in 
Marine Corps history, especially regard-
ing maneuver thinking . In particular 
we draw on the post-Vietnam intellec-
cual renaissance in the Marine Corps, 
which emphasized the development of 
critical thinking skills and professional 
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military education under the leadership 
of Gen Alfred Gray, as a way to inspire 
a reinvigoration of strategic thinking 
and education to meet the challenges 
and uncertainty of the future. 
Critical Thinking, PME, and Maneu -
ver Warfare 
After the decades-long Vietnam war 
effort, the United States faced great 
challenges, including a great power 
competition with the Soviet Union, a 
burgeoning terrorist threat , an inHation-
ravaged economy, and the transition 
co the All-Volunteer Force .S Military 
thinkers were again beginning co ques-
tion the future of the Marine Corps and 
the need for an amphibious capabil-
ity in the Nuclear Age.6 The quali ty 
of the Marine officer was also chal-
lenged. In 1978, Willi am Lind, who 
would become an influential member 
of chc: maneu ver warfare movement, 
wrote a critique of Marine officers-
observing the lack of new tactical or 
operational concepts in troduced in 
the Gautte , which he attributed to an 
inadequate knowledge of the ory and 
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history and a promotion system that 
did not emphasize theoretical ability.7 
He was also critical of how unwilling 
some senior officers were to adapt to 
the changing security environment. In 
the face of such challenges, the Marine 
Corps began the long march toward the 
development of the maneuver warfare 
thought process. 
The maneuver warfare movement 
partially traces its roots to Vietnam 
in the 1960s. Body count strategies, 
centralized decision making unable to 
cope with fluid battles, and inadequate 
doctrine led to the early adoption of ma-
neuver warfare tenets on the battlefield 
and created a burning desire for change 
among junior members of the officer 
corps following the war. 8 Gen Gray 
proved instrumental in the development 
of multiple hardware programs, such as 
the LCAC, V-22 Osprey, HMMWV, 
and the light armored vehicle, which 
increased the Marine Corps' mobil-
ity on the barclefield and facilitated its 
adoption of maneuver thinking/theory.9 
However, Gen Gray never lost sight of 
the primacy of the individual Marine 
and his bias for action as the basis of 
maneuver warfare. 
Based on chis mindset, Gen Gray 
rook a bottom-up approach to imple-
menting maneuver warfare, notably 
as CG, 4th MAB, the Marine Corps 
Development & Education Command, 
and 2d MarDiv. In addition to tinkering 
with task organizations and increasing 
the mobility and firepower of Marine 
GCEs, Gen Gray began to combat the 
anti-intellectual current in the Marine 
Corps at the time by making reading 
and serious self-study an expectation. 
For example, as CG, 2d MarDiv, he 
consolidated a packet of literature on 
maneuver warfare for his Marines to 
read, 10 activated a "professional study 
group,'' 11 and established a Maneuver 
Warfare Board to ace as a clearinghouse 
for spreading ideas on maneuver war-
fare. 12 Additionally, during his time 
at Quantico, after working-hours de-
bates-wherein the merits of a given 
idea and not the rank of the holder 
mattered-were commonplace. 13 This 
enthusiasm for ideas enabled Gen Gray 
to recruit Marines to come work for 
him at rhe Doctrine Center in Quan-
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cico, which helped create momentum 
for maneuver ideas. 14 At Lejeune, he 
consistently fielded requests to join the 
2d MarDiv. The Marines knew they 
were creating something which inspired 
them to relish the challenge .1; 
As part of chis, Gen Gray was deter-
mined to make his leaders and junior 
Marines think. During after-action re-
views, for example, he was more con-
cerned about why a Marine did what he 
did (and what he was chinking about it) 
than what he did. 16 In continually chal-
lenging his Marines in command post 
and field exercises, which emphasized 
"free play" instead of scripted scenarios, 
he lee his Marines discover the merits of 
the maneuver philosophy fim-hand_l7 
... Gen Gray took a bot-
tom-up approach to im-
plementing maneuver 
warfare ... 
The creation of an open and collab-
orative environment that broke down 
traditional notions of hierarchy was es-
sential to nurturing critical and creative 
thinking. A tireless operational critic, 
Gen Gray insisted on these after-action 
reviews following wargame and field 
or command post exercises, during 
which discussions cook place without 
rank insignia being visible, thus encour-
aging open dialogue and emphasizing 
the merit of ideas over rank. 18 Addi-
tionally, even though outside of Gray's 
immediate purview, maneuver warfare 
discussion groups at Camp Pendleton-
inspired by those at Lejeune-insisted 
on participants, regardless of rank, 
referring to one another as "Sir," thus 
placing a similar emphasis on the merit 
of ideas.19 The conceptual debates in 
the Gazette, also central to the eventual 
organizational embrace of maneuver 
thinking, were not inhibited by a def-
erence co rank eicher.2° 
The emphasis Gen Gray placed on 
ideas and undemand ing the need for 
fresh inputs involved non-Marines as 
well, leading to an eclectic mix of reform 
minded politicians, military theorists, 
staffers, and Army officers who joined 
forces with the Marine maneuverists. 21 
For example, a retired U.S. Air Force 
Colonel, fighter pilot, and influential 
military theorise, John Boyd, inspired 
a generation of Pentagon reformers 
with his broad perspective on warfare 
encapsulated in his famed "Patterns 
of Conflict" lecture.22 Gen Gray and 
ocher influential Marine maneuverists, 
such as Col Mike Wyly, invited Boyd 
to speak to their Marines, beginning 
in the early l980s. 23 William Lind, 
a legislative aide to Senators Robert 
Taft, Jr. and Gary Hart, proved to be 
another key contributor to the debate 
and the conceptual development of 
maneuver warfare. He was a frequent 
contributor to rhe Gnzetteand initially 
met Gen Gray at a seminar at Carlisle 
Barracks in the mid-1970s. Though 
Lind was known to be an iconoclast at 
times, Gray was willing to speak with 
anyone who had ideas and wanted to 
help. 24 Additionally, inviting outsiders 
to contribute helped avoid the deleteri-
ous impact of becoming a closed system 
while fostering innovative thought. Ir 
also embodied one of the most impor-
tant roles of education; to help broaden 
minds-helping scudencs learn how to 
think about complex issues (not what to 
think) and reinforcing the importance 
oflearning as a lifetime activity. 
The intellectual underpinnings and 
arguments in maneuver chinking (rep-
resented, for instance, in the Gazette de-
bates and Boyd's briefings) fie well with 
Gray's maneuver exercises and broader 
oper ational philosophy and experience. 
This created a synergy chat enabled him 
to nudge the entire organization toward 
a maneuver warfare philosophy chat in-
corporated people (e.g., study groups) , 
organizational processes (e.g., exercises), 
and thinking (e.g., core organizational 
documents, especially FMFM 1). 
When he became Commandant, 
Gen Gray institutionalized the intellec-
tual renaissance undergirding maneuver 
warfare by revitalizing the Command 
and Staff College curriculum and fac-
ulty, publishing a reading list for all 
Marines (enlisted and officers), revising 
the Marine Corps lnstituce professional 
education curriculum, introducing a 
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Professional NCO and SNCO Edu -
cation Training Syscem, and securing 
funding for the construction of a cred-
ible library and research center. Gray's 
vision was to consolidate "all of che edu-
cational type institutions in the Marine 
Corps under the broad umbrella of such 
a Marine Corps University" - an insti-
tution which soon celebrates its 30th 
anniversary. lS 
Success on the battlefield in Op -
eration DESERT STORM was in many 
respects due to maneuver warfare. 26 
Gen Gray proved to be a transforma -
tional leader not because of any tech-
no logy or hardware he championed , 
but rather because of the intellectual 
renaissance he led, which empowered 
the institution's most precious asset: the 
individual Marine. As Rep Ike Skelton, 
(D -MO) noted, having observed the 
Marine Corps ' transformation under 
Gray's leadership: "The Marine Corps , 
thanks to Genera l Al Gray, did a com-
plete 180-degree turnaround, which 
today makes us very, very proud of the 
Marine Corps, nor just in ics graduat e 
staff level, but now with its War Col-
lege."27 
''He will be known for 
many achievements, 
but most prominent 
will be his title as 'the 
Professional Education 
Commandant.,n28 • 
General Gray's Educational Vision and 
the Future 
Ike Skelton was a keen observer of 
the military and was in charge of the 
Military Education ("Skelton") Panel in 
the late 1980s. He believed che educa-
tion of officers was a lifelong process and 
studying military history was central to 
it: a vision he shared with Gen Gray.29 
Gen Gray's maneuver warfare trans-
formation had important educational 
underpinnings and elements too. 
Maneuver warfare is a warfighting 
philosophy pred icated on competent 
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leadership , decentralized command, 
and empowering young leaders to adapt 
to changing circumstances and generate 
a faster operational tempo by making 
and implementing decisions consistently 
faster than che enemy.3° Gen Gray, who 
found greater kinship with Sun Tzu 
than Clausewitz, remarked, •sue I be-
lieve in the indirect approach. I believe 
in the absolute essentiality of using the 
subtleties of war and chinking as part 
of the major game plan."31 
As such, Gen Gray's intent for the 
Marine Corps PM E system was to teach 
military judgement, not material co be 
memorized. 32 History , Gray noted, 
should be used to teach such judgment, 
"not to make academic historians or 
simply teach facts."33 He insisted that 
lesson plans enabling learning objec-
tives, and term inal learning objectives 
are " inappropria te for education," and 
that it is inherently impossible to "ob-
jectively" or "quant itatively" measure 
an art. 34 
Imbuing this sense of judgmenr 
will become increasingly important to 
a Marine Corps with increasingly less 
combat experience. The first President 
of Marine Corps University, then-BGen 
Paul K. Van Riper, observed: 
I often noted in my two years at Quan-
tico that the primary •weapon" that 
officers possess remains their mind s 
... [and) that books provide the "am-
mun ition" for th is weapon ... I wanted 
to impart a simple lesson: a properly 
schooled officer never arrives on a bat-
tlefield for the first time, even ifhe has 
never actually trod the ground, if that 
officer has read wisely to acquire the 
wisdom of those who have experienced 
war in times pasr.35 
Such vicarious exper iences impart wis-
dom and military judgment and enable 
"practitioners of war to see familiar pat-
terns of activity and to develop more 
qu ickly potential solutions to tactical 
and operational problems"-o ne of the 
first pr inciples of maneuver warfare.36 
He eagerly embraced the case study 
method as most conducive to instill• 
ing such judgment and critical chinking 
skills in our Marines. 
The importance of critical thinking 
is not only crucial to fostering initiative 
on the battlefield, but also in managing 
change (e.g., through articulating our 
hardware needs to Congress). Congress-
man Mike Gallagher, who served as an 
intelligence officer in the Marine Corps 
for seven years and now sits on the 
Seapower and Projection Forces Sub-
committee of the House Armed Services 
Committee, observed that traditional 
arguments for seapower and the defense 
budget have fallen Rat, necessitating a 
new, more compelling story identifying 
what the future Acer will do and how 
it will differ from coday's.37 
Hope for rhe Past , Lessons from the 
Future 
Thro ughout Gray's strategic lead-
ership of the Marine Corps, chinking 
and education remained central; his 
awareness of people, ideas, and orga• 
nizations made him unusually skilled 
in leading the change toward an orga· 
n ization embracing man euver warfare. 
This did not happen overnight, but over 
time, changes were graduall y built into 
" how che organization was thinking " 
and fighting. Though a seemingly radi-
cal transformation, it was quite incre-
mental and evolutionary in nature . A 
deta iled examination of his leadership 
and the organizational t ransformation 
will give useful insights into how to 
create organizational cha nges in the 
future, but here we just point to a few 
implicat ions in light of current debates 
regardi ng PME . 
Last April, Under Secretary of the 
Navy, Thomas Modly, convened an 
Education for Seapower (E4S) Study 
to "develop a series of observations 
and recommendations for knowledge-
based cont inu ing learning throughout 
the naval services."38 In full recognition 
rhat there are no simple solutions, a few 
observations from th e Marine Corps' 
post-Vietnam revival chat may inspire 
future changes are : 
• The centrality of leadmhip; inspire 
and tmdmtand; do not dictate or pre-
scribe. This can be done by enabling 
forums that foster creative and in-
novat ive discussions and thought . In 
conuast to this way, requirements are 
oftentimes a symptom of the abdica-
tion of leadership. When Gen Gray 
appeared before the Skelton Panel , 
Marine Corps Gazette• June 2019 
Education in the school house or unit PME is important. (Phoro by Cpl A1111in Weck.} 
he noted that the joint PME require-
ments in the Goldwater-Nichols Act 
noc only cold the Service Chiefs what 
to do, but also how to do it, which 
cook away their flexibility and was in-
imical to the ideals of mission-type 
orders.39 
• Quality over qwzntity. More require-
ments can easily lead to a box-checking 
mentality and a creeping careerism, 
which Gen Gray disliked.4° 
• A greater appreciation for opportu-
nity costs. Gen Gray made thinking a 
priority. Today, however, constantly 
increasing requirements and admin-
istrative matters can make us victims 
of a "tyranny of the inbox" syndrome. 
Retired U.S. Army MG Robert Scales 
often remarked that the DOD is "too 
busy to chink." It is easy co become too 
focused on whac is seemingly urgent 
rather than what is important. 
• Fresh input. In the spirit of the E4S 
Scudy and Gen Gray's emphasis on 
thinking, judgment, and education, 
the Marine Corps (as well as ocher 
Services) might find inspiration in 
how other professions and their edu-
cational institutions have transformed 
and improved in the past.41 
Finally, the importance of the evo-
lutionary nature of seemingly dramatic 
changes. When asked about whether the 
establishment of permanent MAGTF 
headquarters, the maritime prepositions 
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squadrons, and the LAV battalions were 
"radical changes" that heralded in a 
"new Corps," LcGen Trainor responded, 
I'm not sure I'd c.itegorize the changes 
as 'radical,' nor is a 'new' Corps emerg-
ing .... What you arc witnessing is the 
fruit of a great deal of past thought and 
effort. It's evolution.iry progress rather 
than revolutionary change. 42 
Enduring organizational changes cakes 
a significant amount of time and effort. 
le promises to get messy; the road to 
progress is rarely easy or straight. 
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